A Wider View
This essay is a recursive examination of a possible lesson one could draw from Conviction Formation Theory.
Its Part II spent a great deal of time showing what formal systems can do. They can expose dependencies, stabilize distinctions, and generate constraint once enough is fixed.
That result is real.
But precisely because this worked so well, another conviction can arise: formal reconstruction is the only defensible way to participate in conviction formation.
Yet nothing so far has established that claim, and CFT gives us little reason to expect it.
One of the practical consequences of CFT is that inquiry does not have to wait until every standard by which we judge it has itself been finally settled. We can work with what currently carries enough force, examine it further when it becomes questionable, and sometimes hold parts of it fixed while examining something else.
CFT recasts the question "Which standards are finally justified enough to authorize all the others?" into a more workable one:
"Given what convinces me now, what can I examine, what can I hold fixed for the moment, and what can I make available for further examination?"
Formal systems are especially good at making some of these relations explicit.
But defensible participation need not be formal.
Questions, comparisons, examples, practices, experiences, stories, and many other things can participate in changing what becomes salient, what possibilities become available, and what eventually becomes convincing. What becomes convincing can still be defensible.
A poem need not work like a proof. A meditation need not work like an argument. Conversations can redirect attention without producing a conclusion. Memories can reorganize a question without stating a premise. An image can make something difficult to ignore without showing that it follows from anything. An experience can alter a conviction before we can say what changed. A perception can reorganize how a situation appears. Unease can arise without presenting an argument for itself.
None of this has to take the form of a formal reconstruction before it can matter to conviction formation.
That does not place it beyond examination.
We can ask what enters conviction formation, what changes through it, what becomes available for further examination, what standards we use in judging what happened, and what remains obscure.
That too can become an object of recursive examination.