On the Limits of Deliberate Belief: An Illustration

A central claim of conviction formation theory is that convictions are not deliberately chosen, but form through processes that operate largely automatically.

This shifts the focus of inquiries into conviction from what we ought to believe to how belief actually takes shape, and shows that conviction is neither chosen at will nor arbitrary.

The following examples attempt to make this visible.

Experiments to change beliefs deliberately:

Indirect Change

Suppose you want to believe that ancient aliens visited Earth and worked with early human civilizations. If you already believe this, try to make yourself believe the opposite. How could you come to believe it?

One approach is to decide to believe it now. Sit down, consider the claim, and choose to accept it.

This does not work. The belief does not take hold.

A different approach changes the conditions under which conviction forms. Reduce sleep. Read only material that supports the idea. Watch videos on the topic. Spend time in discussion forums where the view is taken seriously. Avoid contact with those who reject it. Repeat this over time.

Additional measures may increase the effect: distract yourself, scroll through social media, drink alcohol, or try when you are very tired or unwell.

Under such conditions, belief may begin to take hold. What once seemed implausible can start to appear possible, then likely, and eventually convincing.

Immediate Constraint

Look outside on a sunny day and see that the sky is blue. Now try to make yourself believe that the sky is red.

Again, you may attempt to decide that it is red. This does not work. The perception remains. The belief does not follow.

Unlike the first case, changing the surrounding conditions is of little help here. As long as you continue to see the sky, the conviction that it is blue is immediately reinforced.

Conviction Formation Theory

These two cases differ in degree and in kind. Some convictions can shift when the conditions that sustain them are altered. Others are stabilized so directly by perception that they largely resist such changes.

In neither case does conviction arise through deliberate choice. It forms under conditions that can be modified, but not simply willed into place.

One might think that the second case reflects a direct constraint by truth. But even here, what appears as true is inseparable from how conviction forms. There is no independent standpoint from which truth can be accessed apart from the conviction formation processes.